A multiagent connectionist model is proposed that consists of a collection of individual recurrent networks that communicate with each other and, as such, is a network of networks. The individual recurrent networks simulate the process of information uptake, integration, and memorization within individual agents, and the communication of beliefs and opinions between agents is propagated along connections between the individual networks. A crucial aspect in belief updating based on information from other agents is the trust in the information provided. In the model, trust is determined by the consistency with the receiving agents' existing beliefs and results in changes of the connections between individual networks, called trust weights. These weights lead to a selective propagation and thus to the filtering out of less reliable information, and they implement H. P. Grice's (1975) maxims of quality and quantity in communication. The unique contribution of communicative mechanisms beyond intrapersonal processing of individual networks was explored in simulations of key phenomena involving persuasive communication and polarization, lexical acquisition, spreading of stereotypes and rumors, and a lack of sharing unique information in group decisions.
Cognition is not limited to the mind of an individual agent but involves interactions with other minds. A full understanding of human thinking thus requires insight into its social development. Sociologists and developmental psychologists have long noted that most of one's knowledge of reality is the result of communication and social construction rather than of individual observation. Moreover, important real-world problems are often solved by a group of communicating individuals who pool their individual expertise while forming a collective decision that is supposedly better than what they might have achieved individually. This phenomenon may be labeled collective intelligence (Lévy, 1997; Heylighen, 1999) or distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995) . To understand such group-level information processing, one must consider the distributed organization constituted by different individuals with different forms of knowledge and experience together with the social network that connects them and that determines which information is exchanged with whom. In addition to qualitative observations and conceptualizations, the phenomenon of distributed cognition has been studied in a quantitative, operational manner, although from two very different traditions: social psychology and multiagent simulations.
Social psychologists have typically studied group-level cognition using laboratory experiments, and their research has documented various fundamental shortcomings of collective intelligence. We often fall prey to biases and simplistic stereotypes about groups, and many of these distortions are emergent properties of the cognitive dynamics in interacting minds. Examples are conformity and polarization, which move a group as a whole toward more extreme opinions (Ebbesen & Bowers, 1974; Isenberg, 1986; Mackie & Cooper, 1984) ; communication within groups that reinforce stereotypes (e.g., Lyons & Kashima, 2003) ; and the lack of sharing of unique information so that intellectual resources of a group are underused (Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998; Stasser, 1999; Wittenbaum & Bowman, 2004) . Although this research provides empirical evidence about real people to convincingly test particular hypotheses, it is often limited to small groups with minimal structures performing tightly controlled tasks of limited duration.
In contrast, the approach of multiagent systems originates in distributed artificial intelligence (Weiss, 1999) and the modeling of complex, adaptive systems, such as animal swarms (Bonabeau, Dorigo, & Theraulaz, 1999) and human societies (Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Nowak, Szamrej, & Latané, 1990) . In these systems, agents interact in order to reach their individual or group objectives, which may be conflicting. However, the combination of their local and individual actions produces emergent behavior at the collective level. In contrast to experimental psychology, this approach has been used to investigate complex situations, such as the emergence of cooperation and culture as well as the selforganization of the different norms and institutions that govern the interactions between individuals in an economy. It manages to tackle such complex problems by means of computer simulations in which an unlimited number of software agents interact according to whatever simple or complex protocols the researcher has programmed them to obey. Although the complexity of situations that can be studied is much greater than in an experimental paradigm, there is no guarantee that the results produced by the simulation say anything meaningful about real human interaction.
Moreover, many of the earlier simulations meant to represent agent interaction are too rigid and simplistic to be psychologically plausible. The behavior of a typical software agent is strictly rule based: If a particular condition appears in the agent's environment, the agent will respond with a particular, preprogrammed action. More sophisticated cognitive architectures may allow agents to learn-that is, adapt their responses to previous experience-but the learning will typically remain within a symbolic, rule-based level. Perhaps the most crucial limitation of many models is that the individual agents lack their own psychological interpretation and representation of the environment. As Sun (2001) deplored, multiagent systems need "better understanding and better models of individual cognition" (p. 6).
Another shortcoming of many multiagent models is their rigid representation of relations between agents. In the most common models, cellular automata, each agent (automaton) occupies a cell within a geometrical array of cells, typically in the form of a checkerboard. Agents will then interact with all the agents in their geometric neighborhood. This is clearly a very unrealistic representation of the social world, in which individuals interact differentially with other individuals depending on their previous experiences with those others. Other types of simulations, such as social network models, are more realistic with respect to human relationships but still tend to be rigid in the sense that the agents cannot change the strength of their relationship with a particular other agent (for a full discussion, see Comparisons With Other Models).
The present article presents a first step toward overcoming these various limitations by proposing an integration of social psychology and multiagent approaches. For this, we present a generic multiagent simulation environment that is as much as possible psychologically plausible, while at the same time remaining as simple as possible. First, each individual agent is represented by a recurrent connectionist network (described shortly) that is capable of representing internal beliefs as well as external information. Such a network can learn new associations between its different concepts through experience. This type of model has been used successfully in the past to model several phenomena in social cognition, including person impression formation (Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004) , group impression formation (Kashima, Woolcock, & Kashima, 2000; Queller & Smith, 2002; Van Rooy, Van Overwalle, Vanhoomissen, Labiouse, & French, 2003) , attitude formation (Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005) , causal attribution (Read & Montoya, 1999; Van Overwalle, 1998) , and many other social judgments (for a review, see Read & Miller, 1998) .
Second, and this is the real innovation proposed in this article, we extend this connectionist model of individual cognition to the social relations between agents. Inspired by previous models developed by Hutchins (1991) and Hutchins and Hazlehurst (1995) , our model consists of a collection of individual networks that each represent a single individual and that can communicate with each other. This is depicted in Figure 1 for three agents. In our model, unlike earlier multiagent models, any agent can in principle interact with any other agent, but the strength of the interaction will adapt to experience. We introduce the fundamental concept of cognitive trust as a measure of the degree to which one agent influences another. Cognitive trust can be defined as the confidence that one agent has in the information communicated by another one. It thus refers to the perceived validity or credibility of received information given the receiver's knowledge about the sender. Note that this is different from the more common meaning of trust, which-apart from other specific uses in law and business-can be broadly summarized as the expectation that another agent would perform some action (as part of an exchange, as a result of one's relationship with the other, or of the power one has over the other). In the remainder of the article, however, we use the shorthand term trust to refer to cognitive trust. Communication involves the transmission of information on the same concepts from one agent's network to another agent's network, along connections whose adaptive weights reflect the perceived trust in the information transmitted. Hence, the group of agents functions as an adaptive, socially distributed network in which information and knowledge are distributed among and propagated between different individual networks.
To demonstrate that this model is realistic, we ran several simulations that can accurately reproduce several of the key experimental results obtained by psychologists studying communication and cognition in groups. Thus, our model was able to directly integrate the two major approaches toward the study of distributed cognition: social psychology and multiagent models. We further situate our model within the broad multiagent landscape by comparing it with related models, and we end with the implications and limitations of the proposed model and identify areas in which further theoretical developments are needed. Suf- fice it to say here that at present our model is purely focused on the processing and exchange of information: Our agents do not try to reap any goal, reward, or utility, like in most game-theoretic simulations of economic rationality or cooperation. The only "actions" they perform are the transmission and interpretation of information, on the basis of prior experience. Yet, these simple assumptions are shown to accurately explain many of the concrete biases that characterize group-level cognition. First, however, we describe the proposed connectionist model in some detail.
A Connectionist Approach to a Collection of Individual Nets
Given the plethora of alternative models that have been applied in the simulation of collective cognition, one may wonder why a connectionist approach was taken to model individual agents. There are several characteristics that make connectionist approaches very attractive (for an introduction, see McLeod, Plunkett, & Rolls, 1998) . A first key characteristic is that the connectionist architecture and processing mechanisms are based on analogies with properties of the human brain. Human thinking is seen as an adaptive learning mechanism that develops accurate mental representations of the world. Learning is modeled as a process of online adaptation of existing knowledge to novel information provided by the environment. For instance, in group judgments, the network changes the weights of the connections between the target group and its attributes so as to better represent the accumulated history of co-occurrences between the group and its perceived attributes. In contrast, most traditional models in psychology are incapable of such learning. In many algebraic models, recently acquired beliefs or attitudes about target groups or persons are not stored somewhere in memory so that, in principle, they need to be reconstructed from their constituent components (i.e., attributes) every time a judgment is requested or a belief is expressed (e.g., Anderson, 1981; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) . Similarly, activation spreading or constraint satisfaction models recently proposed in psychology can only spread activation along associations but provide no mechanism to update the weights of these associations (Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Read & Miller, 1993; Shultz & Lepper, 1996; Spellman & Holyoak, 1992; Spellman, Ullman, & Holyoak, 1993; Thagard, 1989) . This lack of a learning mechanism in earlier models is a significant restriction (see also Van Overwalle, 1998) .
Second, connectionist models assume that the development of internal representations and the processing of these representations occur in parallel by simple and highly interconnected units, contrary to traditional models in which the processing is inherently sequential. The learning algorithms incorporated in connectionist systems do not need a central executive, which eliminates the requirement of centralized and deliberative processing of information. This suggests that much of the information processing within agents is often implicit and automatic. Most often, only the end result of these preconscious processes enters the individual's awareness. Likewise, in human communication, much of the information exchange is outside the agents' awareness, as individuals may not only intentionally express their opinions and beliefs verbally but may also unknowingly leak other nonverbal information through the tone of voice, facial expressions, and so on (although we do not study these latter aspects).
Finally, connectionist networks have a degree of neurological plausibility that is generally absent in previous algebraic approaches to information integration and storage (e.g., Anderson, 1981; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) . They provide an insight in lower levels of human mental processes beyond what is immediately perceptible or intuitively plausible, although they go not so deep as to describe real neural functioning. Unlike traditional models, they reveal a number of emergent properties that real human brains also exhibit, such as the lack of a clear separation between memory and processing. Connectionist models naturally integrate long-term memory (i.e., connection weights) and short-term memory (i.e., internal activation) with outside information (i.e., external activation). In addition, on the basis of the principle that activation in a network spreads automatically to interconnected units and concepts and so influences their processing, connectionist models exhibit emergent properties such as pattern completion and generalization, which are potentially useful mechanisms for an account of the confirmation bias of stereotype information dissemination within and between agents in a group. An Individual's Net: The Recurrent Model An individual agent's processing capacities are modeled by the recurrent auto-associator network developed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1985) . We apply this network for two reasons. First, we want to emphasize the theoretical similarities that underlie the present simulations on multiagent communication with earlier simulation work on social cognition mentioned earlier (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005; Van Rooy et al., 2003) . Second, this model is capable of reproducing a wider range of social-cognitive phenomena and is computationally more powerful than other connectionist models that represent an individual agent's mental processing, like feedforward networks (Van Overwalle & Jordens, 2002; see Read & Montoya, 1999) or constraint satisfaction models (Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Shultz & Lepper, 1996 ; for a critique see Van Overwalle, 1998) .
A recurrent network can be distinguished from other connectionist models on the basis of its architecture (how information is represented in the model), the manner in which information is processed, and its learning algorithm (how information is consolidated in the model). It is important to have some grasp of these properties, because the extension to a collection of individual networks described shortly is based on very similar principles.
Architecture
The architecture of an auto-associative network is illustrated in Figure 2 for a talking and a listening agent (the trust weights between agents should be ignored for now and are discussed later). Its most salient property is that all units are interconnected with all the other units (unlike, for instance, feedforward networks in which connections exist in only one direction). Thus, all units send out and receive activation. The units in the network represent a target issue (e.g., objects, persons, or groups such as the Jamayans; see Lyons & Kashima, 2003) as well as various attributes associated with the issue (e.g., behaviors, abilities, or traits such as smart and honest). The connections linking the issue's object with its attributes represent the individual's beliefs and knowledge about the issue. For instance, an individual may believe that waitresses are talkative, and the strength of this belief is represented by the weight of the waitress 3 talkative connection.
Information Processing
In a recurrent network, processing information takes place in two phases. During the first activation phase, each unit in the network receives activation from external sources. Because the units are interconnected, this activation is automatically spread throughout the network in proportion to the weights of the connections to the other units. This spreading mechanism reflects the idea that encountering a person, a group, or any other object automatically activates its essential characteristics from memory. The activation coming from the other units is called the internal activation (for each unit, it is calculated by summing all activations arriving at that unit). Together with the external activation, this internal activation determines the final pattern of activation of the units (termed the net activation), which reflects the short-term memory of the network. Typically, activations and weights have lower and upper bounds of approximately Ϫ1 and ϩ1.
In nonlinear versions of the auto-associator used by several researchers (Read & Montoya, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, 1998) , the net activation is determined by a nonlinear combination of external and internal inputs updated during a number of internal updating cycles. In the linear version that we use here, the net activation is the sum of the external and internal activations after one updating cycle through the network. Previous simulations by Van Overwalle and colleagues (Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005; Van Rooy et al., 2003) revealed that the linear version with a single internal cycle reproduced the observed data at least as well.
Because we introduce a similar activation updating algorithm for our extension later on, we now present the automatic activation updating in more specific mathematical terms. Every unit i in the network receives external activation, termed ext i , in proportion to an excitation parameter E which reflects how much the activation is excited, or
This activation is spread around in the auto-associative network, so that every unit i receives internal activation int i which is the sum of the activation from the other units j (denoted by a j ) in proportion to the weight of their connection to unit i, or
for all j i. The external activation and internal activation are then summed to the net activation, or
According to the linear activation algorithm (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988, p. 167) , the updating of activation at each cycle is governed by the following equation:
where D reflects a memory decay term. In the present simulations, we used the parameter values D ϭ E ϭ 1 as done previously by Van Overwalle and colleagues (Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005; Van Rooy et al., 2003) . Given these simplifying parameters, the final activation of unit i reduces to the sum of the external and internal activation, or
Memory Storage
After the first activation phase, the recurrent model enters the second learning phase in which the short-term activations are stored in long-term weight changes of the connections. Basically, these weight changes are driven by the difference between the internal activation received from other units in the network and the external activation received from outside sources. This difference, also called the error, is reduced in proportion to the learning rate that determines how fast the network changes its weights and learns. This error-reducing mechanism is known as the delta algorithm (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988; McLeod, Plunkett, & Rolls, 1998) .
For instance, if the external activation (e.g., observing a talkative waitress) is underestimated because a weak waitress 3 talkative connection (e.g., the belief that waitresses are not very talkative) generates a weak internal activation, then the waitress 3 talkative weight is increased to reduce this discrepancy. Con- Figure 2 . The functional role and adjustment of trust weights in communication between agents, illustrated when a talking agent expresses his or her opinion on the honesty (attribute) of the people of the Jamayans (issue object); if the talker's expressed activation is close to versus different from the listener's internal activation on the same attribute, this may lead to an increase versus decrease of the trust weight involving that attribute.
versely, if the external activation is overestimated because a strong waitress 3 talkative connection generates an internal activation that is too high (e.g., the belief that waitresses do not stop talking), the weight is decreased. These weight changes allow the network to develop internal representations that accurately approximate the external environment.
In mathematical terms, the delta algorithm strives to match the internal predictions of the network int i as closely as possible to the actual state of the external environment ext i and stores this information in the connection weights. This error-reducing process is formally expressed as
(see McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988, p. 166) , where ⌬w j3i is the change in the weight of the connection from unit j to i, and is a learning rate that determines how fast the network learns. An implication of this learning algorithm is that when an object and its feature co-occur frequently, then their connection weight gradually increases to eventually reach an asymptotic value of ϩ1. When this co-occurrence is not perfect, then the learning algorithm gradually converges to a weight (e.g., ϩ.50) that reflects the proportion of supporting and conflicting co-occurrences (e.g., 50%).
Communication Between Individual Nets: The Trust Extension
The standard recurrent model was augmented with a number of features, which enabled it to realistically reproduce communication between individual agents. This extension assumes that beliefs about objects and their attributes are represented in broadly the same manner among different agents. Communication is then basically seen as transferring the activation on the object and its attributes from talking to listening agents. This is accomplished by activation spreading between agents in much the same way as activation spreading within the mind of a single individual, with the restriction that activation spreading between individuals is (a) limited to identical attributes and (b) in proportion to the trust connection weights linking the attributes between agents. A crucial aspect of these trust connections is that they reflect how much the information on a given object or attribute expressed by a talking agent is deemed trustworthy, reliable, and valid. Thus, the connections through which individuals exchange information are not simply carriers of information but, more crucially, also reflect the degree of trust in this information. This is the cornerstone of our extension to a collection of recurrent networks, and therefore, we termed our extended model trust.
Because agents can play the role of speaker or listener, the trust connections in the model go in two directions: sending connections for talking and receiving connections for listening (see Figure 2) , and each agent has both. Note that different trust weights exist for every meaningful object or attribute in the network. Thus, we may trust someone's knowledge on a psychological topic but distrust his or her sports expertise; or we may trust someone's ideas on honesty but disagree that they apply to a particular person or group or even doubt that we are talking about the same persons after all. Because connectionist systems do not make a principled differentiation between units, all units-be it an individual, social group, or their attributes-play the same role in the network. In developing this extension toward multiagent information exchange, we were strongly inspired by a number of communicative principles put forward by philosophers and psychologists. Specifically, the two trust connections implement to a great deal Grice's (1975) communicative maxims of quality and quantity.
Maxim of Quality: Sending Trust Weights
The maxim of quality suggests that to communicate efficiently, communicators generally try to transmit truthful information ("Try to make your contribution one that is true"; Grice, 1975, p. 46 ). In the model, the maxim of quality is implemented on the side of the receiving agent. Listeners filter information in proportion to how much they trust that information based on their extant beliefs. This is implemented in sending trust connections from the talking to the listening agent for each issue (see Figure 2) . When trust concerning a specific issue is maximal (ϩ1), the information expressed by the talking agent is unfiltered by the listening agent. To the degree that trust is lower, information intake by the listener is attenuated in proportion to the trust weight. When trust is minimal (0), no information is processed by the listening agent.
For convenience, we refer to all units involving a communicated issue and its associated attributes as issue i. The listener l receives information on each issue i from all other talking agents t in proportion to the trust weights and then sums it; or in mathematical terms, for each issue i,
where ext li represents the external activation received by the listening agent l on issue i, trust ti3li is the trust weight from the talking agent t to the listening agent l, and a ti denotes the activation generated and expressed by talking agent t. Through comparison with Equation 2, it can be seen that this mechanism of trust spreading between agents is a straightforward copy of activation spreading of standard connectionist models within a single agent. Grice's (1975) maxim of quantity suggests that communicators transmit only information that is informative and adds to the audience's knowledge ("Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purpose of the exchange," p. 45). Similarly, research on group minority suggests that communicators tend to increase their interaction with an audience that does not agree with their position. This is implemented in the model by the receiving trust weights from the listening agents to the talking agent (see Figure 2 ). These weights indicate how much the talking agent trusts the listening agent on a particular issue and hence control how much the taking agent talks about it. To the extent that these trust weights are high (above trust starting weights, trust O ), knowledge and agreement on an issue is assumed, and the talking agent will reduce expression of these ideas (attenuation). In contrast, when these weights are low (below trust starting weights, trust O ), the talking agent increases expression of these ideas more strongly (boosting). Because the talking agent may receive different receiving trust weights from different listening agents l, we take the maximum 1 receiving trust weight to talking agent t on issue i, or trust TI ϭ max(trust ti4li ) for all agents l. Hence, for each target issue i expressed by talking agent t,
Maxim of Quantity: Receiving Trust Weights
where a ti is the activation expressed by the talking agent t on issue i (limited between Ϫ1 and ϩ1), and Ͻ Ͻ means that the term on the left is at least a small threshold (of .05) smaller than the term on the right. In contrast, for all other issues j agent t is talking about, the reverse change of activation occurs (limited between Ϫ1 and ϩ1):
Note that when an agent talks about several issues, then an interaction ensues between attenuation and boosting. For instance, if listeners agree strongly on two issues i and j, then issue i tends to boost talking about j, but conversely, issue j tends to attenuate talking about j (and similarly for talking about i), resulting in little change in the activation of i and j overall. However, there will be more talking about further issues k.
Adjustment of Trust Weights
Given that perceived trust plays a crucial role in the transmission of information, it is important to describe how the trust weights are developed and changed in the model. This adjustment process is alike for receiving and sending trust weights, because they depend on the same underlying process within the listening agent. Like the standard delta learning algorithm in which learning is determined by the error between internal and external signals within the individual agents, trust depends on the error between external beliefs (expressed by another talking agent) and the agent's own internal beliefs. For a given issue, if the error within the listening agent is below some trust tolerance, the trust weight for that issue is increased toward 1; otherwise, the trust weight is decreased toward 0. In mathematical terms, the change in trust weight by the listening agent l on issue i expressed by agent t, or ⌬trust ti3li , is implemented as follows:
where ext li represents the external activation received by the listening agent l, int li is the internal activation generated independently by the listening agent l, ␥ is the rate by which trust is adjusted, and |a ti | is the absolute value of the activation on issue i by the talking agent t. In contrast to Equation 5 of the delta algorithm, here the absolute value of the error and the talking activation i is taken, because trust is assumed to vary from low (0) to high (ϩ1) only and hence depends on the absolute error between external and internal activation (in proportion to the absolute strength of the activation by which the talking agents express their ideas).
To give an example, imagine that the talking and listening agent agree on the honesty of the Jamayans and that both have a connection of ϩ.80 between these two units (see Figure 2) . How does the system, and more in particular the listener, recognize the communication on the attribute honesty as truthful? For the sake of simplicity, we ignore attenuation and boosting (see Equation 8 ). When the talker activates the Jamayans unit (with default activation ϩ1), this activation spreads internally to honesty in proportion to the connection weight (ϩ.80; see Figure 2 , dotted arrow on the left) and thus becomes ϩ.80. This activation is then communicated or transmitted along the trust weight (ϩ.50; see Figure 2 , dotted arrow on bottom), arriving at the listener with an external activation ext li of ϩ.40 for honesty. Now, something similar happens within the listener. When the talker expresses the Jamayans issue, this activation of ϩ1 is transmitted through the trust weight (ϩ.50) arriving at the listener with an activation of ϩ.50, which is then internally spread within the listener through the connection with honesty (ϩ.80; dotted arrow on the right) resulting in an internal activation int li of ϩ.40. Thus, the external activation (what the listener hears) and the internal activation (what the listener believes) on the attribute honesty are identical, and the talker 3 listener trust weight involving this attribute will increase. Conversely, as soon as the external and internal activations begin to differ, and this difference exceeds the trust threshold, the trust weight will begin to decrease.
In summary, the larger the sending trust ti3li becomes, the more the listening agent l will trust the talking agent t on issue i communicated and the more influential the talking agent will become (maxim of quality). In addition, the larger the receiving trust ti4li becomes, the more the talking agent t will restrain the expression of his or her ideas on this issue (maxim of quantity). A summary of the steps in the simulation of a single trial is given in Table 1 .
General Methodology of the Simulations
Having spelled out the assumptions and functioning of the trust model, we apply it to a number of classic findings in the literature on persuasion, social influence, interpersonal communication, and group decision. For explanatory purposes, most often, we replicated a well-known representative experiment that illustrates a particular phenomenon, although we occasionally also simulated a theoretical prediction. Table 2 lists the topics of the simulations we report shortly, the relevant empirical study or prediction that we attempted to replicate, as well as the major underlying processing principle responsible for reproducing the data. Although not all relevant data in the vast attitude literature can be addressed in a single article, we believe that we have included some of the most relevant phenomena in the current literature. However, before discussing these simulations in more detail, we first provide an introductory overview of the different processing phases in the simulations, and we end with the general parameters of the model.
Coding of Learning and Communicating
In all simulations, we assumed that participants brought with them learning experiences taking place before the experiment. This was simulated by inserting a prior learning phase, during which we briefly exposed the individual networks to information associating a particular issue object with some attributes. Although these prior learning phases were kept simple and short for explanatory reasons (involving only 10 trials), it is evident that real-life exposure is more complex, involving direct experiences or observations of similar situations, or indirect experiences through communication or observation of others' experiences. However, our intention was to establish connection weights that are moderate so that later learning still has sufficient impact.
We then simulated specific experiments. This mostly involved a talking and listening phase during which agents communicated. As demonstrated shortly, given that the issue topic was typically imposed externally (by the experimenter), this was designed as external activation, and the internal activation spread automatically from this external input reflects the participant's own thoughts on the issue. We then simulated talking by spreading these two sources of activation in the talking agent's units-through the trust weights-to the corresponding listening agents' units representing the same concepts (see Table 1 for the exact order of the computations). The particular conditions and trial orders of the focused experiments were reproduced as faithfully as possible, although minor changes were introduced to simplify the presentation (e.g., fewer trials or arguments than in the actual experiments).
Measuring Beliefs and Communicated Content
At the end of each simulated experimental condition, we ran test trials to assess the dependent variables of the experiments. The specific testing procedures are explained in more detail for each simulation. The obtained test activations of the simulation were then compared with the observed experimental data. We report the 
General Model Parameters
In spite of the fact that the major experiments to be simulated used very different stimulus materials, measures, and procedures, all parameters of the auto-associator are set to the same values, unless noted otherwise. As noted earlier, the parameters of the individual nets were the same as in earlier simulations by Van Overwalle and colleagues (Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005; Van Rooy et al., 2003 ; E ϭ D ϭ number of internal cycles ϭ 1, and a linear summation of internal and external activation; see Equation 4). The last parameter implies that activation is propagated to neighboring units and cycled one time through the system. The other parameters are listed in Table 3 . To ensure that there was sufficient variation in the data to conduct meaningful statistical analyses, we initialized all weights at the specified values plus additional random noise between Ϫ.05 and ϩ.05.
Persuasion and Social Influence
Once people are in a collective setting, it appears that they are only too ready to conform to the majority in the group and to abandon their own personal beliefs and opinions. Although dissenting minorities may possibly also have some impact, the greater influence of the majority is a remarkably robust and universal phenomenon. Two major explanations have been put forward to explain the influence of other people in a group: pressure to conform to the norm and informative influence. This section focuses on this latter informative explanation of social influence: Group members assess the correctness of their beliefs by searching for adequate information or persuasive arguments in favor of one or the other attitude position. Perhaps one of the most surprising upshots of this informative influence or conversion is group polarization-the phenomenon that after a group discussion, members of a group on average shift their opinion toward a more extreme position. The next simulation demonstrates that the number of arguments provided to listeners is crucially important in changing their beliefs. In addition, we illustrate that the trust multiagent model predicts decreasing group polarization as communication between group factions declines.
Simulation 1: Number of Arguments
Key experiment. To demonstrate that the sheer number of arguments communicated to other people strongly increases their willingness to adopt the talker's point of view, we now turn to an illustrative experiment by Ebbesen and Bowers (1974, Experiment 3) . This experiment demonstrates that shifts in beliefs and opinions are to a great extent due to the greater number of arguments received. Participants listened to a tape recording of a group discussion, which contained a range from few (10%) to many (90%) arguments in favor of a more risky choice. As can be seen in Figure 3 , irrespective of the arguments heard, the participants shifted their opinion in proportion of the risky arguments heard in the discussion.
Simulation. Table 4 represents a simplified learning history of this experiment. The first five cells reflect the network of the talking agent (i.e., the discussion group), and the next five cells reflect the network of the listener. Each agent has one unit reflecting the issue object (i.e., topic of discussion) and four units reflecting its attributes (i.e., the features of the arguments). Each row reflects a trial or act of learning or communicating, and depending on the specific issues and features present or absent at a trial, the respective units are turned on (activation level Ͼ 0) or turned off (activation level ϭ 0). Because this is the first simulation, we describe its progress in somewhat more detail.
First the discussion group from which the recording was taken (talking agent) learns the features or characteristics involving the discussion topic. This learning was implemented in the first prior learning phase of the simulation (see Table 4 ).
Next, each participant listens to the recorded talks by the discussion group (i.e., talking agent). As can be seen, talking is implemented during the talking and listening phase by activating the issue object (i.e., topic of discussion) in the talking agent and then allowing the agent's network to spread this around and generate internal activation (i.e., own beliefs). Both sources of activation then initiate the talking about one's own opinions; that is, they spread to the listening agent in proportion to the trust weights where it is received (as indicated by a "?"-denoting little ears-in the cells). The varying number of arguments is implemented in the simulation by having one, three, five, seven, or nine talking and listening trials, which corresponds exactly to the number of risky arguments used by Ebbesen and Bowers (1974) . In the simulation, we employed the same set of four feature units to denote that these units represent essential aspects in all arguments (i.e., that the behavior involves risk), and a repetition of these aspects is what increases the changes in the listener's opinion. Finally, after the arguments have been listened to, the listener's opinion is measured in the test of belief phase by activating (or priming) the topic in the listening agent and allowing the neural network of the listener to generate its internal activation (i.e., own beliefs). This internal activation is then recorded (as indicated by "?") and averaged. These simulated data are then projected onto the observed data for visual comparison.
Results. The statements listed in Table 4 were processed by the network for 50 participants with different random orders. In Figure 3 , the simulated values (dashed lines) are compared with the attitude shifts (bars) observed by Ebbesen and Bowers (1974) . Because the starting weights of the listener are always 0 (and additional random noise), the simulated data reflect a final attitude as well as an attitude shift. As can be seen, the simulation fits very well, and the correlation between simulated and observed data is significant, r ϭ .98, p Ͻ .01. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the simulated attitude further reveals a significant main effect of the proportion of arguments heard, F(4, 245) ϭ 4.63, p Ͻ .001. Note that these results do not change appreciably when attenuation and boosting (maxim of quantity) is turned off in the simulation.
Extensions and discussion. The simulation demonstrates that some minimal level of trust is needed to pass information from one agent to another. Trust may have several determinants, such as familiarity, friendliness, and expertise of the source. Another very powerful determinant of trust is membership of a group. Typically, people trust members from their own group more than members of another group, as dramatically demonstrated by Mackie and Cooper (1984) . Using the same paradigm as Ebbesen and Bowers (1974) , they found that listeners' attitudes were strongly altered after hearing arguments from an ingroup but were much less affected when the same arguments came from an outgroup or a collection of unrelated individuals. We successfully simulated this effect by repeating the previous simulation, with the crucial modification that in the ingroup condition, all starting talking 3 listener trust weights were set to ϩ1 (to reflect that the listeners trust the talking agents completely), and in the outgroup/individual condition, all starting talking 3 listener trust weights were set to 0 (to reflect complete lack of trust).
Interlude Simulation: Polarization
The trust model predicts that persuasive communication alone leads to group polarization because the continuing influence of the majority's opinions gradually shifts the minority's dissident position in majority direction (except, of course, when trust between group members is very low). This prediction is consistent with a meta-analysis by Isenberg (1986) demonstrating that persuasive argumentation has stronger effects on polarization than group pressure or social comparison tendencies to conform to the norm. This prediction is briefly demonstrated in the next simulation. We simulated 11 agents, each having three units denoting the topic of discussion, as well as a positive and a negative valence unit denoting the position on the topic (for a similar approach, see Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005) . By providing more or fewer learning Note. Schematic version of learning experiences based on Ebbesen and Bowers (1974, Experiment 3) . Each row represents a trial (i.e., act) of learning or communicating, where cell entries denote external activation, and empty cells denote no activation. Feat ϭ features of the arguments; # ϭ number of times the trial is repeated; i ϭ internal activation generated by the talking agent after activating the discussion topic; ? ϭ (little ear) external activation received from the talking agent; in the test phase, ? ϭ denotes the activation read off for measuring activation. trials with the positive or negative valence units turned on, we manipulated the agents' position on an activation scale ranging between Ϫ1 and ϩ1. We then allowed all agents to exchange their ideas with all other agents (on each discussion round, each agent talked two times to everybody else). Afterward, we measured the agents' attitude by priming the topic and reading off the difference between the positive and negative valence units.
As can be seen in the left panel of Figure 4 , polarization was already obtained after one discussion round, as all agents moved their position in the direction of the majority, and this pattern was further strengthened the more the participants exchanged their ideas. It is important to note that to obtain these results, we set the tolerance parameter to a stricter value of .10 instead of .50. If tolerance was left at the default value of .50, all agents in the group converged to the middle position (average activation 0). This suggests that to shift the minority to a majority position (to obtain polarization), deviance must be tolerated less. This is probably due to the nature of the task. It seems plausible that when people talk about important beliefs and values, they are less likely to change their ideas than when they are informed about an unknown or novel topic on which they have no a priori opinion, as in Simulation 1.
Previous simulation work with cellular automata (see Comparisons With Other Models) has suggested that deviant minorities are protected against majority influence by the spatial distance between the two groups. We extended this idea by considering social distance as a more crucial and realistic parameter, because people may be less influenced by others because they are farther apart not only in space but also in social status, role, group, and the like. In line with the dominant effect of persuasion in polarization mentioned earlier (Isenberg, 1986) , we simulated social distance by restricting the exchange of information between the minority and majority groups (a) to half the amount of the previous simulation or (b) to zero (while keeping the overall communication alike by increasing the communication within groups). As the middle and right panels of Figure 4 demonstrate, under these circumstances the influence of the majority was strongly reduced and even totally abolished.
Communication
Communication is a primary means by which people attempt to influence and convert each other (Kraus & Fussell, 1991 , 1996 Ruscher, 1998) . Our primary focus is on research exploring information exchange and how this affects participants' beliefs and opinions. These studies go one step further than those from the previous section by studying actual and spontaneous conversation, and by recoding the content of these conversations, the researchers collected data on the natural course of information exchange.
Simulation 2: Referencing
Key experiment. Several studies explored how people use language to identify abstract or concrete objects. This paradigm is termed referencing (e.g., Kingsbury, 1968; Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964 , 1966 Schober & Clark, 1989; Steels, 1999; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992) . Typically, one person is designated as the "director" and is given the task to describe a number of unfamiliar pictures to a "matcher" who cannot see these pictures and has to identify them. To provide a satisfactory solution to the task, both participants have to coordinate their actions and linguistic symbols to refer to the pictures and have to establish a joint perspective during the conversation (Schober & Clark, 1989) . This collaborative process is also termed grounding. The aim of the research is to assess how this perspective taking and coordination influences the participants' messages and the adequacy of these messages. Figure  5 (top panel) depicts the typical outcome of such studies (Kraus & Fussell, 1991) . On their first reference to one of the pictures, most directors use a long description, consisting of pictorial attributes. Next, matchers often ask clarifying questions or provide confirmation that they understood the directions (e.g., Schober & Clark, 1989, p. 216) . Over the course of successive references, the description is typically shortened to one or two words. Often the referring expression that the conversants settle on is not one that by itself would evoke the picture. This is taken as evidence that people do not simply decode and encode messages but collaborate with each other moment by moment to try to ensure that what is said is also understood. Schober and Clark (1989) conducted such a referencing experiment, in which a director described a number of unfamiliar pictures, and the matcher had to identify the intended one from a collection of pictures. Their experiment is interesting, because unlike previous studies, they recorded not only the verbal descriptions of the director but also the reactions of the matcher (Experiment 1). An analysis of the messages (see Figure 5 , bottom panel) shows that both directors and matchers used progressively fewer words to describe the pictures, although directors-because of their explanatory role in the conversation-used more words than did matchers.
Simulation. Table 5 represents a simplified simulation of this experiment. The architecture and learning history are very similar to the previous simulations, as it contains two agents, each having one unit to refer to the image and four units to describe its features. For illustrative purposes, we used the features from the martini example in Figure 5 (top panel) . First, the director studied a figure during a prior observation phase. Next, during the talking and listening phase, both agents talked and listened to each another in a randomized sequence, with the sole limitation that the director talked more often than the matcher. Although this is clearly far from the content of a natural conversation in which a matcher asks for specific clarification and elaboration and the director provides targeted answers and descriptions, as we will see, these minimal assumptions with respect to the amount of talking are sufficient to replicate the basic effect. Of most importance here is that not all features are equally strongly connected with the object. However, rather than allowing the network to randomly generate stronger and weaker connections for some features (which would be more natural, as the connection strength differs between the participants), we set the activation values of the two last features to a lower value to make this assumption explicit. To test the content of the conversation, we simply measured the average activation during the talking and listening phase.
Results. The statements listed in Table 5 were processed by the network for 50 participants with different random orders. In Figure 5 (bottom panel), the simulated values (dashed lines) are compared with the observed number of words (bars). As can be seen, the simulated and observed number of words matched very well, and the correlation between them was significant (r ϭ .99, p Ͻ .001). An ANOVA on the simulated data further revealed a significant main effect of the number of words for the director, F(5, 294) ϭ 111.01, p Ͻ .001, as well as for the matcher, F(5, 294) ϭ 56.26, p Ͻ .001.
Extensions and discussion. The same simulation approach was applied with success to related work on referencing (Kingsbury, 1968; Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964 , 1966 with the same parameters, except for a lower initial trust weight in Kingsbury (1968) . Schober and Clark (1989) also tested the accuracy of matchers and other people who overheard the communication between director and matchers, and we were also able to replicate these accuracy results.
How does the simulation produce the decreasing pattern of words over time? In the introduction of the trust model, we explained that the maxim of quantity is implemented by the trust weights from the listening agent to the talking agent. A high talker 4 listener weight indicates that the listener is to be trusted and reduces the expression of topics that the listener is already familiar with, while boosting the expression of other information. Consistent with the maxim of quantity, when attenuation and boosting was turned off in the present simulation, the pattern of results changed (i.e., the number of words did not decline completely and started to go up again after some time). However, there was also a second, more important reason for the reduced number of words.
Although our network cannot make a distinction between, for instance, descriptions, questions, or affirmations, it ensures that only the strongest connections with a feature of the picture are reinforced and are ultimately singled out as "pet" words to describe the whole picture. The weaker connections die out because repeating the same information over again overactivates the system. Because stronger connections already sufficiently describe the object, the weaker connections are overshadowed by them and become obsolete. This property of the delta algorithm is also known as competition or discounting (see Van Overwalle, 1998; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; Van Rooy et al., 2003) . In the simulation, this overshadowing by stronger connections is clearly demonstrated when all the features are given an equal and maximum connection strength of ϩ1 (by providing all an activation of ϩ1) in the prior learning phase. Under this specification, the simulated pattern differs from the observed data (i.e., it showed a less robust and smooth decrease in number of words so that, for instance, the number of word was not always the highest on the first trial).
Thus, whenever people repeat information, our cognitive system makes its memory representations more efficient by making reference to only the strongest features, and the other features are gradually suppressed. For instance, people typically simplify recurring complexities in the outside environment by transforming them into stereotypical and schematic representations. This points to a cognitive mechanism of efficiency in memory as an additional reason for the decreasing number of words, in addition to coordination and establishment of a joint perspective during the conversation (Schober & Clark, 1989) . One might even argue that joint coordination through simplification in the reference paradigm is so easy and natural precisely because it relies on a basic principle of cognitive economy that our brain uses constantly.
Interlude Simulation: Talking Heads
In his talking heads experiment, Steels (1999 Steels ( , 2003 Steels ( , 2005 Steels & Belpaeme, 2005) describes an open population of cognitive robotic agents who could detect and categorize colored patterns on a board and could express random consonances to depict them. With this naming game about real-world scenes in front of the agents, Steels (1999) wanted to explore how humans created meaningful symbols and developed languages. Although the present trust model obviously does not have the full capacities of Steels's robots, it is able to replicate the naming game that the robots also played. Four different sorts of meaning extraction are potentially problematic in this process: the creation of a new word, the adoption of a word used by another agent, the use of synonyms by two agents, and ambiguity when two agents use the same word for referring to different objects (i.e., homonyms).
To simulate these four types of meaning creation, a talking and listening agent first learned their respective word for two objects, and then after mutual talking and listening (to an equal degree), we tested how the listening agent generated the meaning of a word that (a) is new for the listener and was used by the talking agent (e.g., for the listening agent a new circle 3 xu connection is created), (b) matches the word of the talking agent (for both agents the same circle 3 xu connection is used), (c) is a synonym for the same object (for the talking agent circle 3 xu is used, and for listening agent circle 3 fepi is used), (d) is ambiguous in that the same word is used for different objects (for the talking agent circle 3 xu is used, and for the listening agent square 3 xu is used). Figure 6 displays how the meanings of the words are created and changed under these four circumstances. Note that we turned off the criterion of novelty (attenuation and boosting) so that we could concentrate on the acquisition of meaning rather than the expression and communication of it. As can be seen, the simulated process for the creation of a new word and matching an existing word are obvious. The new word gradually acquires strength, and the matched word keeps the high strength it has from the beginning. For synonyms, the simulation reveals a competition between words. To denote a circle, the listening agent gradually loses its preference for fepi in favor of the word xu that is then used more often (although the synonym fepi is still used). For ambiguous words, the simulation predicts no competition so that the ambiguity is not really solved. Instead, xu tends toward a meaning at a higher categorical level referring to both objects alike (like the Note. Schematic version of learning experiences based on Schober & Clark (1989, Experiment 1) . Each row represents a trial of learning or communicating, where cell entries denote external activation, and empty cells denote no activation. Trial order was randomized in each phase and condition. # ϭ number of times the trial is repeated; i ϭ internal activation generated by the talking agent after activating the picture; ? ϭ (little ear) external activation received from the talking agent; in the test phase, ? ϭ activation of talking agents during the previous talking phase.
term geometric figures refers to circles and squares), although the listening agent keeps its initial preference for square 3 xu because it is the more prototypical member of the category.
Simulation 3: Stereotypes and the Rumor Paradigm
A surprising finding in recent research on stereotyping is that our stereotypic opinions about others are not only generated by cognitive processes inside people's head (see Van Rooy et al., 2003 , for a connectionist view) but are further amplified by the mere communication of these beliefs. Several investigations have demonstrated that information that is consistent with the receiver's beliefs is more readily exchanged, whereas stereotype disconfirming information tends to die out (Brauer, Judd, & Jacquelin, 2001; Kashima, 2000; Klein, Jacobs, Gemoets, Licata, & Lambert, 2003; Lyons & Kashima, 2003; Ruscher & Duval, 1998; Schultz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000; Thompson, Judd, & Park, 2000) . This process reinforces extant stereotypes even further, attesting to the crucial role of social communication such as rumors, gossip, and so on in building impressions about others.
Key experiment. The maxim of quality suggests that communication is more effective when the information is considered trustworthy. Hence, we might expect that people with similar stereotypical background (and who thus are mutually experienced as trustworthy), exchange their stereotypical beliefs more often. In contrast, people with a different background evaluate each other as less trustworthy. In addition, because they exchange conflicting information (from their opposing background), their messages tend to cancel each other out. To illustrate these predictions of the trust model, we simulate a study undertaken by Lyons and Kashima (2003, Experiment 1) . This study stands out because the exchange of information was tightly controlled and recorded for each participant. Specifically, information was communicated through a serial chain of 4 people. One person began to read a set of information before reproducing it from memory to another person. This second person then read this reproduction before then reporting it verbally to a third person and so on, much the same way as rumors are spread in a community. The information in the study involved a story depicting a member of a fictional group, the Jamayans. Before disseminating the story along the chain, general stereotypes were induced about this group (the background information). In one of the conditions, all 4 participants in the chain were given the same stereotypes about the Jamayans as being smart and honest (actual shared condition). In another condition, 2 participants were given stereotypes about the Jamayans that were opposite to that given to the other 2 participants, so that each subsequent participant in the chain held opposing group stereotypes (actual unshared condition). The target story given afterward always contained mixed information that both confirmed and disconfirmed the stereotype.
As can be seen in Figure 7 (left panel), when the stereotypes were shared, the reproduction became more stereotypical further along the communication chain. The story was almost stripped of stereotype-inconsistent (SI) information, whereas most of the stereotype-consistent (SC) information had been retained. In contrast, when the stereotypes were not shared (right panel), the differences between SC and SI story elements were minimal.
Simulation. We simulated a learning history that was basically similar to the original experimental procedures used by Lyons and Kashima (2003, Experiment 1) . The architecture involved five agents, each having five units consisting of the topic of the information exchange (i.e., Jamayans), two SC traits (smart and honest), and two SI traits (stupid and dishonest). As can be seen in Table 6 , for the actual shared condition, we provided during the prior SC information phase 10 stereotypical trials indicating that the Jamayans were smart (by activating the Jamayans and the smart unit) and 10 stereotypical trials indicating that they were honest (by activating the Jamayans and the honest unit) for each of the agents. For the actual unshared condition, Agents 2 and 4 received contradictory information indicating that the Jamayans were stupid and dishonest (by activating the stupid and liar units) during the prior SI information phase. Next, during the story phase, the first agent received ambiguous information about a member of the Jamayans: five SC trials reflecting story elements indicating that he was smart and five SI story elements indicating that he was a liar. This story was then reproduced by this agent and received by the next agent. That is, the Jamayans unit in Agent 1 was activated and, together with the internal activation (i.e., expression of beliefs) of the other smart/stupid and honest/liar units in Agent 1, was then transmitted to Agent 2. After listening, Agent 2 expressed his or her opinion about the Jamayans to Agent 3, then Agent 3 to Agent 4, and finally Agent 4 to Agent 5 (the participants in the fourth position of the experimental chain were led to believe that there actually was a fifth participant). After each talking and listening phase, we measured how much the talking agent had expressed or communicated the notion that the Jamayans were smart, stupid, honest, or liars.
Results. We ran the statements from Table 6 for 50 participants in the network with different random orders. As can be seen in Figure 7 , the simulation closely matched the observed data (r ϭ .93, p Ͻ .001). Separate ANOVAs with sharing (shared vs. unshared) and position (1, 2, 3, or 4) as factors, reveal a significant interaction for both the SC and SI story element, F(3, 392) ϭ 19.29 -19.93, ps Ͻ .001. Separate t tests show that all adjacent positions differed reliably, except for SC information in the shared condition. This suggests that in the shared condition, the amount of SC information transmitted from one agent to the other was almost completely maintained, in contrast to the SI information, which decreased. In the unshared condition, the expression of both types of information decreased. Note that boosting or attenuation of belief expression (maxim of quantity) should not play a role here, as the agents had no opportunity to hear their communication partners before telling their own story and so were unable to test whether they agreed on the Jamayans' attributes. To verify this, we ran the simulation with boosting and attenuation turned off and found identical results. This strongly suggests that for a rumor paradigm involving novel interlocutors, the initial trust in a talking agent's statements (maxim of quality) was sufficient for creating a stereotype confirmation bias during group communication.
Extensions and discussion. We also successfully simulated related work on stereotyping and impression formation using the rumor paradigm and free discussions (but without recording and analyzing the conversation itself), such as the studies by Thompson, Judd, and Park (2000 Although we had to change our parameters somewhat in some of the simulations (e.g., changing the initial trust or tolerance levels), overall, this attests to the wide applicability of our approach.
Simulation 4: Maxim of Quantity and the Expression of Stereotypes
The maxim of quantity suggests that when the audience is knowledgeable and agrees with the communicator's position, less information is transmitted. Recall that in the model, the maxim of quantity (implemented by a strong talker 4 listener trust weight) indicates that the listener is to be trusted and that expression of the same issue or attribute can be attenuated, but the expression of another issue or attribute should be boosted.
Key experiment. To illustrate the working of the maxim of quantity, we now apply the trust model to another data set from the same empirical study by Lyons and Kashima (2003) , described above. In this study, Lyons and Kashima provided half of their participants with the false information that the other participants in the chain had received completely similar background information on the Jamayans (perceived complete knowledge), whereas the other half were given the false information that the other participants were completely ignorant (perceived complete ignorance). As shown in Figure 8 , the results indicated that given the belief of complete knowledge, both SC and SI story elements were reproduced, and no substantial stereotype bias emerged. In contrast, in the complete ignorance condition, a stereotype bias became apparent in that SI story elements were strongly suppressed.
Simulation. We ran the same simulation as before, with the following modifications. To obtain high trust weights from the listening agents to the talking agents, (a) we included only the Note. Schematic version of learning experiences based on Lyons and Kashima (2003, Experiment 1) . Each row represents a trial of learning or communicating, where cell entries denote external activation and empty cells denote no activation. The shared condition is always preceded by the SC information for each agent, and the unshared condition is preceded by the SC or SI information alternately for each agent, both followed by the mixed story, and talking, and listening phases. Trial order was randomized in each phase and condition. SC ϭ stereotype consistent; SI ϭ stereotype inconsistent; # ϭ number of times the trial is repeated; i ϭ internal activation generated by the talking agent after activating the Jamayans; ? ϭ (little ear) external activation received from the talking agent; in the test phase, ? ϭ activation of talking agents during the previous talking phase.
actual shared condition, and (b) in the perceived complete knowledge condition, we set the initial trust weights from listening to talking agents .20 above the trust starting weight for the units involved in the transmission of SC information (Jamayans, smart, honest). These high trust weights directly simulate the notion that the listening agents were to be trusted more than usual because they share the same background with the speaker.
Results. As can be seen in Figure 8 , the simulation matched the observed data, although not above conventional levels of significance (r ϭ .81, p ϭ .19), partially because of a lack of data points (only four) and partly because of the implementation of the maxim of quantity. If only boosting on other issues were implemented (without attenuation of familiar issues), then the simulation would match almost perfectly the observed data. However, because attenuation of known information is the core idea of the maxim of quantity (see Grice, 1975) , we left this crucial aspect intact. An ANOVA revealed the predicted significant interaction between perceived sharing (knowledge vs. ignorance) and type of information (SC vs. SI), F(1, 796) ϭ 139.92, p Ͻ .001. Further t tests revealed that although the difference between SC and SI was still significant under complete knowledge, t(398) ϭ 4.45, p Ͻ .001, it was much less so than under complete ignorance, t(398) ϭ 23.25, p Ͻ .001. The implementation of the maxim of quantity was crucial in the simulation of higher SI information in the complete knowledge condition. This strongly suggests that when people believe they share a similar background, the maxim of quantity helps to neutralize the stereotype confirmation bias in communication.
Simulation 5: Group Problem Solving and Sharing Information
It is often believed that a group as a whole has more intellectual resources to help solve a problem than do individuals, because some members may have crucial information that others do not have and that may lead to a solution. By pooling all such unique information, the group as a whole should make considerably better decisions. However, contrary to this ideal of group problem solving, research has revealed that unique information is discussed less often than shared information, and if it is, it is often brought in the discussion much later (Stasser, 1999; Stasser & Titus, 1985) . This, of course, reduces the efficiency and speed of group problem solving (Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998) .
This result is unexpected. Would one not expect, on the basis of Grice's (1975) maxim of quantity, that group members discuss known or shared information less in favor of novel information? Why, then, are they doing the opposite? One explanation, put forward by Stasser (1999) is that shared information has a sampling advantage. That is, because shared information has a higher probability of being mentioned than does unique information (because many members hold shared information), groups tend to discuss more of their shared than their unshared information. However, each time an item of shared information is brought forth, because most group members hold this just-mentioned item, the probability to sample additional shared information is reduced more than unique information. This sampling explanation predicts more discussion of shared information at the start of a discussion, and unique information is brought in the discussion later. Another explanation, based on the idea of grounding, was put forward by Wittenbaum and Bowman (2004) . They argued that group members attempt to validate one's thoughts and ideas by assessing their accuracy and appropriateness through comparison with others. Shared information can be socially validated and hence provides opportunities to evaluate each other's task contributions, whereas unshared information cannot. Therefore, it is exchanged more often.
The idea that people validate their thoughts and ideas through comparison with others is also at the core of our approach. Indeed, social validation and trust depend on the information being consistent with one's beliefs. As put forward by Stasser (1999) , because of uneven sampling probabilities, shared information is communicated more often at the beginning of a group discussion. However, after the information has been validated, trust is high, and the maxim of quantity kicks in. This implies that after a while, discussion of shared information is attenuated while discussion on other issues is boosted, and so increases the discussion of unique ideas.
Key experiment. To illustrate the working of the maxim of quantity in group problem solving, we conducted a simulation of an empirical study by Larson et al. (1996) . Participants in this study watched a short videotaped interview of a patient by a physician in an examination room. Three different videotapes were created. Roughly half of the information in each tape was also present in the other tapes (shared condition), and the remaining information was present in one tape alone (unique condition). Each videotape was shown to different teams consisting of a mixture of medical students and established experts. Afterward, each team discussed the case and produced a differential diagnosis. This discussion typically lasted less than 20 -25 min. Figure 9 shows the percentage of shared as opposed to unique information as the discussion unfolded, where each discussion position reflects the point in the discussion at which a new item was introduced (i.e., omitting the repetitions). As can be seen, there is a negative linear trend in that initially a lot of shared items are discussed, whereas at the end more unique items are mentioned.
Simulation. We simulated a discussion by three agents (although only two are shown in Table 7 ). Each agent had seven units (although only five are shown) consisting of the object of discussion (i.e., the patient), three shared items, and three unique items. To simulate the viewing of the videotape, during the learning phase, we ran five trials for each agent, in which all of the shared items and a single unique item were learned. Next, in the talking and listening phase, we let all agents freely talk about all of the shared and unique items. Because agents knew only about a single (unique) item at the beginning of the discussion, this actually provided a sampling advantage for the shared information at the start. To avoid an a priori sampling advantage in the simulation, we used the minimal assumption that each agent expressed a single shared and a single unique item during each discussion round. Given the interplay between attenuation and boosting, this left each agent in the simulation completely free to talk as much as he or she wanted about the issue. After each round, we measured how much each agent had communicated the shared and unique items.
Results. We ran the statements from Table 7 for 50 participants with different random orders. As can be seen in Figure 9 , the simulation closely matched the observed data (r ϭ .85, p Ͻ .001). A one-way ANOVA on the percentage of shared information reveals the predicted main effect of the discussion position, F(34, 2665) ϭ 335.98, p Ͻ .001. This confirms that according to the simulation, as the discussion progresses, more unique information is transmitted.
Extensions and discussion. Research by Stewart and Stasser (1995) indicated that when members were explicitly told about their relative expertise (i.e., their knowledge of their unique information), then the communication of unique information was facilitated. To simulate this effect, we set all receiving trust weights to ϩ1 for the unique information on which the agent was the sole expert and then ran the simulation again. As can be seen in Figure 9 , more unique information was communicated under these conditions, consistent with the empirical findings. Note that providing high trust weights to all information, including shared information, did not lead to this effect because that again gives a sampling advantage to shared information.
We also simulated a well-known study by Stasser and Titus (1985) that illustrated the lack of sharing unique information. This study served as input for the DISCUSS computer simulation developed by Stasser (1988) to explore and illustrate his theoretical ideas about the integration of information in group discussion and decision making. We did not select this study for the present article, in part because the data input and simulation are somewhat more complex and because it provided data not on actual information exchange but only on the end result in participants' beliefs. Nevertheless, a simulation with our model and the same parameters (except the learning rate which was reduced to .25 for more robust results) replicated the major significant results and yielded a mean correlation of r ϭ .79 with observed postdiscussion preferences (Stasser & Titus, 1985, Table 5 ).
Comparisons With Other Models
It is not the first time that computer modeling has been used to aid in the understanding of social relationships and influence and to verify the assumed theoretical processes underlying these phenomena. Several categories of computer models can be distinguished: cellular automata, social networks, and different types of neural networks (see also Nowak, Vallacher, & Burnstein, 1998) . We describe each of these approaches, discuss their shortcomings and strengths, and compare them with the present model.
Cellular Automata and Social Networks
In cellular automata and social networks, the units of the model represent single individuals, and the connections represent the relationships between individuals. This type of model deals not with processes within an individual, but rather with those between individuals.
Cellular automata. Cellular automata consist of a number of agents (automata) arranged in a regular spatial pattern such as a checkerboard. Each automaton possesses a limited number of attributes (typically one or two) that can be in a limited (often binary) number of states, such as cooperate or defect, or positive or negative opinion. Typically, individuals are linked to their neighbors, and the nature of the linkage is changed by an updating algorithm. Depending on the specific models, these links may represent different characteristics such as persuasiveness, propensity for cooperation, decision strategies, and so on (Nowak et al., 1998) . Cellular automata allow for capturing of regularities and patterns of social norms or opinions in a group, whereas individual agents update their behavior solely on the basis of local information between neighboring agents. For instance, the pioneering work by Nowak et al. (1990) on the social impact model gave rise to important insights such as the role of geographical clustering in protecting deviant minority opinions from being overthrown by a vast majority (see also Interlude Simulation: Talking Heads). Likewise, Axelrod's (1997) culture model (see also Axelrod, Franz, 1996, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, p. 323 . Reprinted by permission of the author. Riolo, & Cohen, 2002; Riolo, Cohen, & Axelrod, 2000) showed that a whole population can converge to a local common culture when agents adopt their attributes on the basis of their similarity with neighboring agents (producing roughly an effect like trust weights). In more recent work, Barr (2004) demonstrated convergence to spatially organized symbolic systems (such as a common language or several dialects), and Couzin, Krause, Franks, and Levin (2005) illustrated that a small proportion of informed individuals can guide a group of naive individuals toward a goal. Kennedy (1999) proposed a more sophisticated particle swarm algorithm that implements error-driven learning from an agent's own experiences or other neighboring agents and in which agents conform to their neighbors, not on the basis of a single attribute like similarity as in previous models, but when their (learned) performance is better than their own. Although cellular automata are flexible with respect to the types of connections they support, they are very rigid with respect to the structure of the social relationships, in that individuals are influenced only by their close neighbors and less (or negligibly) so when they are farther apart in space. Hence, social relations are strongly determined by the geometry of the social space, rather than being based on individual choices (Nowak et al., 1998) .
Social networks. This geometrical limitation is relaxed in social networks, in which social relations between individuals are depicted as connections among units in a graph. This makes it possible to describe social properties of individual agents (e.g., popularity vs. isolation) as well as properties of the groups of individuals (e.g., clustering of opinions in cliques). For instance, Janssen and Jager (2001) developed a consumat approach in which agents decide to consume products that have the highest personal preference or social preference (e.g., have the largest market shares). However, a limitation of social networks is that the links are often specified in binary positive-negative (or present-absent) terms and do not allow for graded strength. Perhaps more important, these models do not provide a general theoretical framework to update the connections in the network. Rodriguez and Steinbock (2004) recently developed a social network model that included graded and adjustable trust relationships between individuals, which appear to better capture the representativeness of decision outcomes. However, given the lack of a general framework, the proposed solution in this as well as in other social networks is often idiosyncratic.
Attractor or Constraint Satisfaction Networks
Like cellular automata and social network, the units of attractor or constraint satisfaction networks represent single individuals, and the connections represent the relationships between individuals. However, unlike these previous models, the connections have graded levels of strength, and their adjustments are driven by general algorithms of weight updating. Specifically, the computations for spreading of information and updating relationships are adopted directly from neural networks. Typically, the architecture is a recurrent structure (like the present model), so that all individuals have unidirectional connections with all other individuals.
Many attractor models represent opinion change as the spreading of information or beliefs across individuals. This social spreading is formalized in a manner similar to that of the spreading of activation in neural models. Eventually, after going through multiple cycles, the model reaches an equilibrium in which the state of the units does not change anymore; that is, the model settles in a stable attractor that satisfies multiple simultaneous constraints represented by the supporting and conflicting states and connections of the other units. Hence, an attractor reflects a stable social structure in which balanced social relationships or attitudes are attained. Nevertheless, attractor networks have a fundamental limitation as models of social relations. Because they are based on an analogy with the brain, Nowak et al. (1998) warned that it is important to remember that neurons are not people and that brains are not groups or societies. One should thus be mindful of the possible crucial differences between neural and social networks . . . [some] differences . . . may reflect human psychology and are difficult to model within existing neural network models. (pp. 117-118) Perhaps the most crucial limitation in this respect is that the individuals in the networks do not have a psychological representation of their environment so that individual beliefs are reduced to a single state of a single unit. This shortcoming was overcome by Note. Schematic version of learning experiences based on Larson, Christensen, Abbort, and Franz (1996) . Each row represents a trial of learning or communicating, where cell entries denote external activation, and empty cells denote no activation. Trial order was randomized in each phase and condition. Uni ϭ unique; # ϭ number of times the trial is repeated; i ϭ internal activation generated by the talking agent after activating the patient; ? ϭ (little ear) external activation received from the talking agent; in the test phase, ? ϭ activation of talking agents during the previous talking phase. Hutchins (1991) . He used constraint satisfaction networks to capture an individual's psychology and memory. Thus, an individual's belief was viewed as the formation of a coherent interpretation of elements that support or exclude each other, in line with earlier constraint satisfaction models of social cognition (Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Read & Miller, 1993; Shultz & Lepper, 1996; Spellman & Holyoak, 1992; Spellman, Ullman, & Holyoak, 1993) . Crucially, he combined these individual constraint satisfaction networks into a community of networks so that they could exchange their individual information with each other. One of the parameters in his simulations is the persuasiveness of the communication among individuals' nets, which is related to our trust weights, although it was only incorporated as a general parameter. A similar approach for two individual nets was developed by Shoda, LeeTiernan, and Mischel (2002) to describe the emergence of stable personality attractors after a dyadic interaction. However, in this model, information exchange was accomplished by interlocking the two nets directly (as if two brains were interconnected without any check or control on the veracity or credibility of the information coming from another person), which is implausible as a model of human communication.
Assemblies of Artificial Neural Networks
The constraint satisfaction model of Hutchins (1991) discussed in the previous section was a first attempt to give individuals their own psychological representation and memory. However, one major shortcoming was that the connections in the individual constraint satisfaction networks were not adaptive; that is, they could not change on the basis of previous experiences (see also Van Overwalle, 1998) . This limitation was addressed by Hutchins and Hazlehurst (1995) in a model that consisted of a collection of recurrent nets. Each individual was represented by a single recurrent net with adaptive weights (and with hidden layers), and all the nets could exchange information with each other. The model illustrated how a common lexicon is created by sharing information between individuals. However, as we understand it, the output of one individual's network served as direct input for another individual's network as if two brains were directly interlocked with each other, without moderation of the perceived persuasiveness or validity of the received information. This limitation was overcome in the present trust model. The Clarion model developed by Sun and Peterson (1999) combined information encoding and learning at the symbolic level as well as the lower connectionist level and permitted that agents influence each other at both levels. Possibly, to date, this is the most sophisticated model in this approach, apart from the robots developed by Steels (1999 Steels ( , 2003 Steels & Belpaeme, 2005) , which give the individual networks a body with primitive perception and movement.
What Has Been Accomplished? Limitations and Implications
The trust model does more justice to the complexity of the human mind, in comparison with earlier multiagent models, by zooming in on the individual level. This allowed simulation of various aspects of human influence and communication in smaller groups as uncovered in empirical research. This constitutes important postdictions of our trust model. Other simulations also demonstrate that scaling up the trust model to larger group phenomenon such as polarization was successful and suggests that the trust model may be applied to societal phenomena at large (although this is beyond the scope of this article).
Robustness of the Simulations
To what extent are the trust simulations dependent on the specifics of the current architecture or parameters? Earlier multiagent simulation work was often limited in the range of phenomena simulated or used a slightly different model for each. Admittedly, for some of the extensions and interlude simulations, we occasionally set the parameters to values other than the default to replicate a particular study or domain of investigation. Perhaps, this is not surprising given that we explored such different contexts. However, it is important to establish the robustness for the major Simulations 1-5 reported earlier, and to do this we ran these simulations again with different parameter ranges and a different architecture.
First, we performed an exhaustive search of the novel trust parameters (i.e., trust learning rate, trust tolerance, and trust starting weights; see also Table 3 ) in a range between .30 and .60 (or Ϯ.10 all default trust parameters) and identified the lowest correlation between simulated and observed data. For all major simulations except one, the lowest correlation was generally only .02 lower than the correlation with default parameters reported earlier, and the simulation showed the same substantive pattern as the human data. The only exception was Simulation 4 on perceived sharedness (Lyons & Kashima, 2003 ; lowest r ϭ .60), which sometimes underestimated the proportion of stereotypical utterances expressed in the shared condition. Although this result may reflect plausible dependencies on trust parameters that also exist in the real world (such as the degree of knowledge by others), as far as we know, Lyons and Kashima's (2003) manipulation has not yet been replicated, so the implications are unclear.
Second, for ease of presentation of the major simulations, up until now we used a localist representation, in which each unit represented a single symbolic concept. However, a more realistic code is a distributed representation, in which each concept is represented by a pattern of activation across a set of units that each represents some subsymbolic microfeature of the concept (Thorpe, 1994) . We reran the major simulations with such a distributed architecture, 2 and the results showed on average the same correlation with the human data as the major simulations reported 2 Each unit was replaced by a set of five units. Their activation was represented by a pattern drawn from a normal distribution with mean as indicated in the learning histories (i.e., Tables 4 -7) and SD ϭ 0.10, and this random pattern was redrawn after each 10th simulation run. In addition, to reflect the imperfect conditions of perception and inference, random noise drawn from a normal distribution with M ϭ 1.0 and SD ϭ 0.10 was added to these activations (hence, the variation in the starting weights was dropped). We kept the same parameters as for the localist representation, except that the standard learning rate was lower (as more units are involved), and the best fitting learning rate we found was either 0.03 or 0.06. earlier. In sum, then, the major simulation results hold across a wide range of parameter settings and stimulus distributions.
Limitations
However, it is also evident that we have charted only the first modest steps in modeling human collective intelligence through communication. Several aspects have been left out so that we could focus on the most important social aspects of communication in a small group of individuals. First, our model leaves unspecified by what linguistic means information is encoded and decoded during transmission from speaker to listener. However, at least at the moment, the omission of language as a tool of communication seems a sensible simplification that already leads to interesting simulation results that replicate existing research data. Some theorists attempted to develop connectionist models in which language was seen as an essential means of human communication that emerges from the demands of the communication rather than from anything inside the individual agents (Hazlehurst & Hutchins, 1998; Hutchins & Hazlehurst, 1995; Steels, 1999; Steels & Belpaeme, 2005) . Second, our model also largely ignores intentional acts by the communicators. To name a few, it does not incorporate communicative acts such as demands, promises, or other requests, or other strategic decisions to fit the information better to the audience's knowledge and background. It also leaves out more subtle strategic maneuvering to please the audience, such as when speakers believe that they can make a better impression by speaking with praise about a person that is liked by the audience (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005; McCann & Higgins, 1992; McCann, Higgins, & Fondacaro, 1991; Schaller & Conway, 1999) . Because such strategic acts are often made deliberatively, they are beyond the current connectionist approach.
Third, a question left unanswered is how trust about agents themselves, such as experts, can be built in the model. Most previous multiagent systems are incapable of developing and applying such knowledge about trustworthy agents. Although space limitations prevented us from elaborating on this in detail, let us briefly note that the present model can incorporate the metanotion about an expert agent as an additional unit in an individual network, so that trust on a given topic carries over through internal connections to a potential expert source. In their single-agent recurrent connectionist model, Van Overwalle and Siebler (2005) further demonstrated how knowledge about source expertise influences one's opinion on an issue.
What to Do Next? Novel Hypotheses
Although incorporating earlier theories and data in a single model is an accomplishment in its own right, theory building is often judged by its ability to inspire novel and testable predictions. In this section, we focus on a few novel predictions involving cognitive trust in information, because this is a novel contribution of the trust model that we see as theoretically most crucial in a communicative context. Although there is increasing awareness that trust is an important core motive in human interaction (Fiske, 2005) , there have been few empirical studies on cognitive trust in social cognition, let alone on its specific role in human communication and information exchange.
What are the determinants and consequences of cognitive trust? Our model proposes that if no a priori expectations on agents exist, people's trust of information is determined by the fit with their own beliefs. Although some degree of divergence is tolerated, if the discrepancy is too high, the information is not trusted. Thus, rather than some internal inconsistency or some internal ambiguities in the story told, it is the inconsistency with one's own beliefs that compels the listener to distrust the information. With respect to the consequences of cognitive trust, our model predicts that more cognitive trust results in more and easier adoption of the expressed views and solutions. In contrast, it takes more time to read and judge untrustworthy messages because as they conflict with one's own beliefs, they require scrutiny of multiple interpretations or more elaboration to be accepted or rejected.
Is cognitive trust applied automatically, outside of consciousness? Because acceptance of information on the basis of trust is based on similar processes in the trust model as activation spreading in standard connectionist models, we suggest that this is a quite automatic process. Likewise, because the change of trust weights in the model is a straightforward extension of error-driven learning algorithms in connectionist models, we suggest that cognitive trust is changed automatically. Consequently, we predict that inferences on cognitive trust are developed spontaneously on the face of information given and that social inferences and decisions are made only when the information is (automatically) seen as trustworthy. There is some initial support for these predictions, as Schul, Mayo, and Burstein (2004) recently found that trusted messages spontaneously elicit congruent associations, whereas distrust leads to the spontaneous activation of associations that are incongruent with a suspected message. In contrast, although automatic to some degree, we expect that other criteria such as novelty and attenuation of talking about known information can be more easily overruled by controlled processes, such as task instructions and goals, as the act of speaking itself is largely within the control of the individual.
On a more societal level, another hypothesis worth further investigation is suggested by our simulation on the diminished adoption of a majority position when the communication between minority and majority groups is decreased, leading to more divergent opinions (see Figure 4) . The interesting question now is, what is the exact amount and type of communication needed for two or more groups to either merge their opinions or remain separate? This problem has immense potential applications, as it describes the all too common situation in society through which two cultures or subcultures live in close contact. In some cases, the minority is assimilated in the majority (e.g., most initial European communities in the United States), in other cases there is strong and apparently growing polarization between groups (e.g., Islamic communities in Europe), leading to potentially violent outbursts. Our model suggests at least two factors that influence the outcome: (a) the amount of communication outside the community, because the more people communicate outside their group, the smaller the probability of divergence between groups and (b) the degree of initial inconsistency between the opinions in the two communities (e.g., different beliefs on women wearing head scarves, which is obligatory according to Islamic extremists and unwanted by a European majority). Further simulations with more agents, more differentiated beliefs, and a more fine-grained manipulation of the amount of communication between the groups should throw more light on the precise conditions in which two cultures will either merge or divide.
Conclusion
The proposed multiagent trust connectionist model combines all elements of a standard recurrent model of impression formation that incorporates processes of information uptake, integration, and memorization, with additional elements reflecting communication between individuals. Although one of many possible implementations, our model reflects the theoretical notion that information processing within and between individuals can be characterized by analogous yet unique processing principles.
One of the unique features of the model is the assumption that acquired cognitive trust in the information provided by communicators is an essential social and psychological requirement of communication. This was implemented through the inclusion of trust weights, which change depending on the consistency of the incoming information with the receiving agents' existing beliefs and past experiences. Trust weights lead to a selective filtering out of less reliable data and selective propagation of novel information, and therefore bias information transmission. From this implementation of cognitive trust emerged Grice's (1975) maxims of quality and quantity in human communication. In particular, the maxim of quality was implemented by outgoing trust weights, which led to an increased acceptance of stereotypical ideas when communicators shared similar backgrounds, whereas the maxim of quantity was simulated by attenuation in the expression of familiar beliefs (as determined by receiving trust weights), which led to a gradual decreased transmission of stereotypical utterances. By spanning a diversity of findings, the present simulations demonstrate the broad applicability and integrative character of our approach. This may lead to novel insights for well-known socialpsychological phenomena and may point to potential theoretical similarities in less familiar domains. It may help in the understanding of why communicating information among the members of a group sometimes makes their collective cognition and judgments less reliable.
One element that distinguishes the present model from earlier approaches, but that is common to most connectionist modeling, is the dynamic nature of our system. It conceives of communication as a coordinated process that transforms the beliefs of the agents as they communicate. Through these belief changes, it has a memory of the social history of the interacting agents. Thus, communication is at the same time a simple transmission of information about the internal state of the talking agent, as well as a coordination of existing opinions and emergence of novel beliefs on which the conversants converge, and therefore leads to a common ground. By combining all those elements in a social-distributed network of individual networks, the unique contribution of our model is that it extends distributed processing, which is sometimes seen as a defining characteristic of connectionism, into the social dimension. This is how social psychology can contribute to the further development of connectionism as tool of theory construction (cf. Smith, 1996) .
